The  FCC\u27s New Formula for Mergers by Dugan, Bradley
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-2009
The FCC's New Formula for Mergers
Bradley Dugan
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bradley Dugan, The FCC's New Formula for Mergers, 29 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 435 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol29/iss3/7
THE FCC'S NEW FORMULA FOR MERGERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio consumers may find it absurd to pay for any type of radio
programming given that all AM and FM radio broadcasters offer their
transmissions for free. Two companies tested the accuracy of this
assumption in 1997 by purchasing the available satellite digital audio radio
services (SDARS or DARS) spectrum' to create satellite radio--a
subscription-based service in which customers receive a broad array of
radio programming in exchange for a monthly fee. 2 Nevertheless, a decade
after XM Satellite Radio (XM) and Sirius Satellite Radio (Sirius) licensed
the SDARS spectrum, the assumption that consumers do not want to pay
for radio appeared to be at least partially correct,3 as both companies failed
to turn a profit and have almost three billion dollars of debt.4 Due to the
high costs of launching satellites and maintaining other infrastructure, as
well as the immense expenses of contracting with high-profile on-air
personalities, both firms struggled financially. 5 In March 2007, hoping to
turn this dismal performance around, XM and Sirius announced plans to
merge. 6
1. SDARS is defined as "[a] radio communication service in which audio programming is
digitally transmitted by one or more space stations directly to fixed, mobile, and/or portable
stations, and which may involve complementary repeating terrestrial transmitters, telemetry,
tracking and control facilities." 47 C.F.R. § 25.201 (2008).
2. See Sirius Satellite Radio, What is SIRIUS, http://www.sirius.com/getsirius (last visited
Sept. 26, 2008); see also XM Satellite Radio, What is XM
http://www.xmradio.com/whatisxm/what-we-offer.xmc (last visited Sept. 26, 2008).
3. In re Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses: XM Satellite
Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion
and Order and Report and Order, 23 F.C.C.R. 12348, 12351 (rel. Aug. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Sirius
XM Memorandum Opinion and Order] ("As of December 31, 2007, [XM and Sirius] collectively,
had approximately 17.3 million subscribers.").
4. See Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at F-5n [hereinafter Sirius
Annual Report] (Feb. 29, 2008); XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K),
at F-6 [hereinafter XM Annual Report] (Feb. 28, 2008).
5. See, e.g., Sirius Annual Report, supra note 4, at 17-20.
6. See In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc.,
Transferee: Consolidated Application for Authority to Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and
Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57 [hereinafter Sirius XM Consolidated
Application] (2007).
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Pursuant to Title 47 of the United States Code Sections 214(a) and
310(d), the applicable standard of review the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) must utilize is whether the applicants demonstrate that
the transfer of control of the licenses from one company to another will
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity. 7 The FCC uses this
broad, well-established statutory test to determine whether the potential
benefits of the transaction outweigh the potential harms. 8 If so, then the
public interest standard is met and the FCC will approve the merger. 9 In
their application to the FCC, XM and Sirius (the Applicants) argued that
increased benefits would flow to the public from the merger, including
increased program efficiency and over three billion dollars in potential
savings. 10 In addition to these merger-specific benefits, the Applicants
agreed to offer, for a three-year period, lower subscription rates, new
subscription plans, and A la carte programming, which would allow
subscribers to choose individual channels from either company. " The
Applicants proposed these conditions on the merger and the FCC
ultimately found that, absent these self-imposed constraints, the merged
entity (Sirius XM) would in fact monopolize the market. 12 However, the
FCC found that because XM and Sirius voluntarily committed to mitigate
any monopolistic effects of the merger, the merger would generate public
interest benefits that would outweigh any harm to the market. 13 In July
2008, the FCC approved the merger that created Sirius XM Satellite Radio
(Sirius XM), even though such a merger is contrary to governmental
policies and basic economic principles. 14
After approving the formation of a monopoly in the satellite radio
industry, the FCC traded the long-term interest of radio consumers for
short-term benefits. Indeed, the Applicants can neither guarantee that
benefits promised by the companies will flow to the public, nor can they
guarantee that the FCC-approved merger will secure Sirius XM's financial
future. The FCC was misguided in permitting the merger for several
reasons: (1) Sirius XM is only required to follow the self-imposed
7. See, e.g., Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12363.
8. See infra Part II.D.
9. See infra Part II.D.
10. In re Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 18 n.39.
11. Id. at i-ii.
12. See Press Release, FCC, Commission Approves Transaction Between Sirius Satellite
Radio Holdings Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Holdings, Inc. Subject to Conditions (July 28, 2008)
[hereinafter Sirius XM Press Release] (on file with FCC),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-284108A 1 .pdf.
13. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12352.
14. See id. at 12350.
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constraints for three years, 15 (2) the FCC order allows Sirius XM to
increase subscription costs if the company experiences poor growth, 16 (3)
both Sirius and XM refused to comply with FCC orders in the past, 7 (4)
the FCC contradicted its own public interest analysis that it used a mere six
years earlier when it denied a merger between the only two satellite
television giants-EchoStar and DirecTV, 18 and (5) the FCC adopted a
"worst-case scenario" approach that allegedly protects consumers from
harm but, in fact, actually insulates this incorrect decision from review. 19
By avoiding the review process through its worst-case scenario assumption
and allowing Sirius XM's self-imposed restrictions, the FCC set a
dangerous precedent whereby proposed anticompetitive monopolies will be
approved in the future.
Part II of this Comment explains the role of the FCC in SDARS
regulation, the development of satellite radio, and provides an overview of
the merger process, with attention focused on the FCC's public interest
analysis. Part III provides background information on the denied EchoStar-
DirecTV merger and the approved Sirius XM merger. Part IV discusses
the potential harms that may flow from the Sirius XM merger and how
consumers may not benefit in the future. This section also demonstrates
how the FCC did not follow its analysis set forth in the EchoStar-DirecTV
transaction, and discusses how a lack of competitors in the field will not
lead to any price discipline. Furthermore, Part IV analyzes the flaws in the
voluntary conditions, predicting how Sirius' and XM's noncompliance with
FCC orders in the past could indicate their willingness to disregard the
conditions of this merger. Finally, Part V concludes with an analysis of the
current state of the satellite radio industry and the effect of the FCC's
recent decision-namely, transforming the public interest framework into a
private interest framework benefiting companies rather than consumers.
15. Sirius XM Press Release, supra note 12.
16. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12394.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (2006) ("If, in the case of any application to which subsection (a)
of this section applies, a substantial and material question of fact is presented or the Commission
for any reason is unable to make the finding specified in such subsection, it shall formally
designate the application for hearing on the ground or reasons then obtaining and shall forthwith
notify the applicant and all other known parties in interest of such action and the grounds and
reasons therefor .... ) (emphasis added).
2009]
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II. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the Federal Communications Commission and
Spectrum Management
The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) established
the FCC and gave the agency broad power and jurisdiction to regulate the
electromagnetic spectrum in the public interest. 20  With this power, the
FCC has the authority to allocate the electromagnetic spectrum, establish
general operational guidelines, and grant licenses for the use of the
spectrum.21 This "spectrum" encompasses "the entire range of
electromagnetic radio frequencies used in the transmission of sound, data,
and video."22  Congress granted the FCC the power to responsibly and
strategically manage the spectrum because it is a finite source with a
growing demand. 23 Spectrum uses include personal use for garage door
openers and computer modems, private use by organizations for radio and
television broadcasts, and public use for police and emergency medical
technicians. 24 Since the spectrum remains a scarce source with many uses,
"one person's transmission is another's interference. 25  Therefore,
"[c]ongress concluded that the federal government has the duty both to
select who may ... broadcast and to regulate the use of the electromagnetic
spectrum to serve the public."26
Given these various spectrum uses, the FCC developed a system
whereby it relies on market forces to shape its spectrum management
because market forces allow flexibility to respond to the changing wireless
communications market.27 The FCC adopted this approach because "[a]s
liberalization, privatization, and competition increasingly characterize
wireless communications policy around the world, market-based licensing
policies will play a critical role in ensuring that the benefits of
telecommunications technologies and services are made available to the
20. WILLIAM E. KENNARD, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, CONNECTING THE
GLOBE: A REGULATORS GUIDE TO BUILDING A GLOBAL INFORMATION COMMUNITY, VII-I
(1999), http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/regguide.pdf.
21. See generally id.
22. FCC, Spectrum, http://www.fcc.gov/spectrum (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Interest" Standard: The Search
for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. COMM. L.J. 605, 629 (1998).
26. Id.
27. KENNARD, supra note 20, at VII-2.
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widest range of people in the most timely and efficient manner. ' 21
Furthermore, the FCC manages the spectrum through "frequency
allocations, allotments, and assignments. ' 29
The FCC currently uses competitive bidding (auctioning) to assign
licenses whenever competing applicants file applications to use the same
limited spectrum. 30 Auctions are used because they assign licenses quickly
to the highest bidding entity and preserve the public interest in the
spectrum by recovering its full value.3
B. The Beginning of Satellite Radio
Satellite radio traces its beginnings to 1992, when the FCC decided to
devote part of the spectrum toward a nationwide distribution of digital
radio service via satellite.32 The FCC auctioned off SDARS in the 2320 to
2345 MHz spectrum band to both XM and Sirius because of the increased
public benefits this new medium of broadcasting could provide.33 Satellite
radio offered more channel choices, fewer commercials, live audio
streaming of sporting events, weather and traffic information, an
assortment of sports, talk and news stations, and niche music stations to
suit any musical taste.34 These new services delivered a crisp digital signal
that, with the use of a transponder, could be transmitted throughout the
whole country and benefit consumers. 35
The satellite radio industry began in 1997 with high expectations of
numerous public benefits. 36 For instance, the FCC found that SDARS
would "benefit communities where terrestrial broadcast service [was] less
abundant" 37 and could provide new services that local radio could not
provide. 38 With its national reach, SDARS promised to provide continuous
radio service to the long-distance commuting public and to people living in
28. Id. at VII-5.
29. Id. at VII-3.
30. Id. at VII-6.
31. Id.
32. Juli-Ann Amos, The History of Satellite Radio, lst-Dish-Tv.net, http://www.lst-dish-
tv.net/historyofsatelliteradio.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2008).
33. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12350.
34. See What is Sirius, supra note 2; What is AM, supra note 2.
35. See What is Sirius, supra note 2; What is AM, supra note 2.
36. In re Establishment of Rules and Policies for the Digital Audio Radio Satellite Service
in the 2310-2360 Mhz Frequency Band, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 12 F.C.C.R. 5754, 5760 (rel. Mar. 3, 1997) [hereinafter SDARS Rules].
37. Id.
38. Id.
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remote areas. 39 Satellite radio also offered new forms of emergency
services. 40  The FCC found that the implementation of SDARS would
foster the development of new technology, more customer oriented
programming, and diversification of program formats, which would
provide valuable niche programming. 41
On March 3, 1997, the FCC adopted rules for the auction of two 12.5
MHz SDARS authorizations in the 2320-2332.5 MHz and 2332.5-2345
MHz frequency bands. 42 The FCC decided to license only two satellite
DARS systems.43 Until recently, XM and Sirius continued to be the only
two SDARS service providers, and the companies individually held their
spectrum licenses. Now that the FCC has approved the merger between
the two companies, they can transfer these licenses 45-something that was
prohibited when the FCC granted the companies their initial licenses in
1997.46
On March 28, 1997, XM (formerly American Mobile Radio
Corporation) and Sirius (formerly Satellite CD Radio) placed winning bids
for approximately $89 million 47 and $83 million 48 respectively. Because
these two corporations were the only companies entering the satellite radio
market, they were each other's biggest competition.
In promulgating its rules for SDARS, the FCC stressed the
importance that competition would play in benefiting the public interest.49
It prohibited the transfer of licenses because it wanted to ensure sufficient
competition in the SDARS industry.5 °  In fact, the FCC viewed
39. Id. at 5760-61.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 5761-62.
42. See SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5758.
43. Id. at 5756. Only 25 MHz of spectrum was available to license and the FCC decided
that a viable and competitive satellite DARS service would require 12.5 MHz of spectrum. Thus,
the FCC auctioned off only two licenses.
44. Sirius and XM were the only two of four companies granted licenses to provide SDARS
services. See FCC Order and Authorization In re American Mobile Radio Corp., Application for
Authority to Construct, Launch, and Operate Two Satellites in the Satellite Digital Audio Radio
Service, Order and Authorization, 13 F.C.C.R. 8829 (1997) [hereinafter XM Authority to
Operate]; FCC Order and Authorization In re Satellite CD Radio, Inc., Application for Authority
to Construct, Launch, and Operate Two Satellites in the Satellite Digital Audio Radio Service,
Order and Authorization 13 F.C.C.R. 7971 (1997) [hereinafter Sirius Authority to Operate].
45. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12352.
46. SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5823.
47. Sirius Authority to Operate, supra note 44, at 7971.
48. XM Authority to Operate, supra note 44, at 8829.
49. See SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5754.
50. Id. at 5823 ("Even after DARS licenses are granted, one licensee will not be permitted to
acquire control of the other remaining satellite DARS license. This prohibition on transfer of
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competition between SDARS providers as essential when auctioning off
the licenses, 5' and believed that licensing two providers would ensure that
subscription rates would stay low and provide more diversity in radio
programming. 52 Ultimately, as a safeguard for promoting competition, the
FCC prohibited one licensee from acquiring control of the other SDARS
license. 53  The FCC concluded that "given the overall competitive
environment within which it will operate,.., licensing two satellite DARS
providers will serve the public interest" because "[1]icensing at least two
service providers will help ensure that subscription rates are competitive as
well as provide for a diversity of programming voices." 54 The FCC was
adamant about having only two separate services, as no auction participant
was allowed to purchase both licenses at the auction. 55 Further, the FCC
required that the companies each make an interoperable receiver that would
be capable of receiving broadcasts from either company. 56  The FCC
explained that "[t]his rule also will promote competition by reducing
transaction costs and enhancing consumers' ability to switch between
competing DARS providers."57 The FCC, therefore, made it clear that at
the genesis of satellite radio, competition between two companies would be
critical.
However, nearly eleven years after ruling on its commitment to
ensuring competition, the FCC allowed two competing companies in the
industry to merge into one entity, Sirius XM.
C. An Overview of the DOJ, FTC, and FCC Merger Approval Process
All proposed merger applications in the telecommunications industry
that are subject to FCC regulations must be approved by both the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
before the FCC begins its approval process.5 8 Generally, the DOJ and FTC
refer to federal antitrust laws found in Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust
Act, Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and Section 5 of the Federal
control will help assure sufficient competition in the provision of satellite DARS service.")
(emphasis added).
51. See id. at 5786.
52. Id. at 5786.
53. Id. at 5823.
54. Id. at 5786.
55. SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5786.
56. Id. at, 5796-98.
57. Id.
58. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of US. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 159 (2008).
2009]
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Trade Commission Act. 9 Respectively, these antitrust laws ensure that
mergers do not lessen competition, restrain trade, or create unfair methods
of competition. 60
In FTC v. HJ. Heinz Co., the FTC brought suit under the Clayton Act
to prevent a merger between the second and third largest producers of
jarred baby food. 61  The appellate court reversed the district court's
decision to allow the merger, noting how "there had been no significant
entries in the baby food market in decades and that new entry was 'difficult
and improbable'. 62 Therefore, the appellate court denied the merger, as
"no court has ever approved a merger to duopoly under similar
circumstances."6 3
Similarly, in FTC v. Staples, Inc., the FTC brought suit to enjoin a
merger between two office product superstores, arguing that the acquisition
would substantially lessen competition in violation of the Clayton Act and
the Federal Trade Commission Act. 64 Observing that the merger would
create a monopoly in certain markets, the court held that "eliminating
Staples' most significant, and in many markets only, rival, this merger
would allow Staples to increase prices or otherwise maintain prices at an
anti-competitive level." 65  As such, the court granted the preliminary
injunction, providing that the proposed merger may substantially lessen
competition and violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 66
Finally, in U.S. v. Franklin Electric Co. Inc., the government brought
suit to enjoin the only two companies that developed, manufactured, and
sold specialized underground pumps at gas service stations from
merging.67  The court noted that "[n]o merger threatens to injure
competition more than one that immediately changes a market from
competitive to monopolized., 68 Additionally, the parties' claims that the
merger would create economic efficiencies that would lead to consumer
benefits were too speculative in nature and not substantiated by evidence. 69
59. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & THE FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2006) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
COMMENTARY].
60. Id.
61. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
62. Id. at 717 (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 116 F. Supp. 2d 190,196 (D.D.C. 2000)).
63. Id.
64. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1069-70 (D.D.C. 1997).
65. Id. at 1082.
66. Id. at 1093.
67. U.S. v. Franklin Elec. Co. Inc., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
68. Id. at 1035.
69. Id.
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Further, the court held "[i]t would be odd if a merger of the kind at issue,
from two producers to one, could be justified by either the efficiencies it
would generate or because the company to be acquired is failing."70 The
court ultimately held that the merger created the possibility of a substantial
impairment of competition and granted the preliminary injunction. 7'
The above cases illustrate how antitrust laws are geared towards
preventing mergers that result in a reduction of competition in the
marketplace. The FTC and DOJ highly scrutinize mergers that result in a
monopolized market, especially when the barriers to entry are high and the
claimed benefits of the merger are too speculative. Once a proposed
merger obtains approval from the FTC and DOJ, the next step in the
merger process involves FCC review.
In order to get FCC approval for a merger, first, the proposed
applicant files an application with the FCC to transfer its
72telecommunications licenses. Next, the FCC gathers information via a
"notice and comment" procedure in which it issues a notice of the proposed
license transfer, solicits comments from third parties, and gathers responses
from the applicant firms.73 Finally, pursuant to the Communications Act,
the FCC balances the potential harms of the merger against the potential
benefits to determine whether approving the merger would serve the public
interest.
D. FCC Review Pursuant to the Communications Act of 1934
The FCC refers to Sections 214(a) and 3 10(d) of the Communications
Act to determine whether the merger applicants have demonstrated that the
proposed transfer of licenses will serve the public interest, convenience,
and necessity. 75 Therefore, the burden of proof is on the applicants to
demonstrate that the transfer of control of the licenses is in the public
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See 47 U.S.C. § 308 (1996) ("The Commission may grant construction permits and
station licenses, or modifications or renewals thereof, only upon written application therefore
received by it .... ); Donald J. Russell & Sherri L. Wolson, Dual Antitrust Review of
Telecommunications Mergers by the DOJ and the FCC, 11 GEO. MASON L. REv. 143, 148
(2002).
73. Russell & Wolson, supra note 72, at 148.
74. See generally Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064,
§ 309 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-309 (2000)).
75. In re Application of EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., Gen. Motors Corp., & Hughes Elecs.
Corp., Transferors, & EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., Transferee, 17 F.C.C.R. 20559, 20574 (rel.
Oct. 18, 2002) [hereinafter New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order]; Sirius XM
Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12363.
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76interest. Although Congress did not define "the public interest,
convenience, or necessity" in the Communications Act,77 its intent is to
preserve and enhance competition in relevant markets78 and to ensure a
diversity of sources of information and services to the public. 79 The FCC
"may consider technological and market changes, and the nature,
complexity, and speed of change of, as well as trends within the
communications industry." 8
0
In order to determine whether a merger would be in the public
interest, the FCC employs a balancing test, weighing the possible harms of
the proposed transaction against the possible benefits. 81 "Meeting [this]
burden typically involves demonstrating that the merger is not likely to
significantly reduce competition, or that any likely anticompetitive effect is
more than offset by other benefits."82  Generally, if the benefits to the
consumers outweigh the possible harms, the public interest test is satisfied,
and the proposed merger will receive FCC approval. Furthermore, the FCC
has noted that "[t]he public interest in this regard is the provision of
services of value to the listening public and includes the protection of
competition, not competitors." 83 Moreover, to facilitate the public interest,
the FCC may "waive specific requirements of the rules on its own motion
or upon request" 84 when "[t]he underlying purpose of the rule(s) would not
be served or would be frustrated by application to the instant case, and that
a grant of the requested waiver would be in the public interest. s5
In addition, courts generally allow the FCC much discretion in
determining what actions are in the public interest. 86 The Supreme Court
has emphasized, and continues to emphasize, the FCC's duty and authority
under the Communications Act to promote diversity and competition in the
media.87 Deferring to the FCC, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he avowed
76. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20574.
77. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(f) (1997).
78. Id. at § 521(6).
79. Id. at § 532(a).
80. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12365.
81. Id. at 12364.
82. Frankel, supra note 58, at 201 (discussing the burden of proof on the merging parties).
83. SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5759.
84. 47 C.F.R. § 1.925(a) (2008).
85. Id. at § 1.925(b)(3)(i).
86. See FCC v. RCA Commc'ns, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 90 (1953) (holding that the FCC is not
required to make specific findings of tangible benefit when determining if the public interest
would be served by competition).
87. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (quoting U.S. v. Midwest
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668, n.27 (1972)).
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aim of the Communications Act of 1934 was to secure the maximum
benefits of radio to all the people of the United States" and that Congress
gave the FCC "comprehensive powers to promote and realize the vast
potentialities of radio." 88 The public interest test is thus a flexible Supreme
Court approved standard that the FCC can use to deny or approve a merger.
The FCC rarely denies applications. 89 Typically, the FCC approves
applications on their face or approves them after the applicants voluntarily
amend their applications to impose restraints or conditions to mitigate the
FCC's concerns of anticompetitive behavior. 90  In fact, most license
transfer applications are non-controversial, enabling the FCC to give
approval within a short amount of time. 91 If the FCC, after weighing the
possible benefits against the possible harms, finds that the transaction does
not serve the public interest, or if the record presents a substantial and
material question of fact, then the FCC designates the application for
hearing under Section 309(e) of the Communications Act. 92 Conversely,
without a substantial or material question of fact, the FCC's decision is not
subject to review. Courts have held that not all applications pending before
the FCC must be designated for hearing. 93 Finally, to determine whether
the facts in question are substantial or material, they need not be in
dispute. 
94
The FCC's competitive analysis under the public interest test is
broader than that of the DOJ and the FTC review. The FCC considers
"whether a transaction will enhance, rather than merely preserve, existing
competition, and takes a more expansive view of potential and future
competition and its impact on the relevant market." 95 Furthermore, the
DOJ and FTC reviews are limited to the competitive effects of the
acquisition 96 "without reference to diversity [of broadcasts], localism, or
88. Nat'l Broad. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943).
89. Russell & Wolson, supra note 72, at 149 (Instead of the FCC flat out denying an
application to merge, the FCC will informally identify any significant competitive concerns that it
finds. The applicants then voluntarily amend their application to reflect these concerns or the
FCC will impose conditions on the license transfers and authorizations).
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing FCC, 2001 Annual Program Performance Report, 12 (2001)).
92. 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (2000).
93. See, e.g., Hartford Commc'ns Comm. v. FCC, 467 F.2d 408, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
94. Stone v. FCC, 466 F.2d 316, 322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
95. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12366.
96. HORIZONTAL MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 2 (2006) ("[T]he Agencies
examine whether the merger of two particular rivals matters, that is, whether the merger is likely
to affect adversely the competitive process, resulting in higher prices, lower quality, or reduced
innovation.").
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other public interest considerations." 97  The FCC, therefore, considers
multiple factors in determining whether the merger benefits will outweigh
the potential harms. However, one similarity between the DOJ/FTC review
and the FCC review is that the FCC adopts the DOJ/FTC provisions for
geographic and products markets when analyzing the horizontal effects of
the proposed merger.
98
E. Defining the Product and Geographic Markets
The FCC adopts the DOJ/FTC Guidelines (Guidelines) to analyze the
effects a merger will have on the relevant product and geographic
markets. 99 Integrating the product and geographic markets allows the
agencies to create a market definition, referred to as the "hypothetical
monopolist" test. This test "identifies which product(s) in which
geographic locations significantly constrain the price of the merging firms'
products." 100 A horizontal transaction occurs when the firms in the
transaction buy or sell services or products that belong to the same relevant
product and geographic markets and when the services or products are
reasonable substitutes. 101 Because of the nature of horizontal transactions,
the FCC usually denies such mergers because allowing horizontal mergers
eliminates competition and increases concentration in the relevant
markets. 102
The Guidelines define the relevant product market as "a product or
group of products such that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm that was
the only present and future seller of those products ('monopolist') likely
would impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in
price" (the "SSNIP test"). 103 This definition depends heavily upon
demand-side substitution, which is a consumer's willingness to switch
between products in response to a price change. 104 In other words, the
97. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12366.
98. Id. at 12367.
99. Id.
100. HORIZONTAL MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 5.
101. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12367 (rel. Aug. 5,
2008).
102. HORIZONTAL MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 2-3.
103. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & TuE FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, § 1.11 (1992) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]; HORIZONTAL
MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 5.
104. HORIZONTAL MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 5; see also U.S. v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (stating that "[tlhe varying circumstances of
each case determine the result. In considering what is the relevant market for determining the
control of price and competition, no more definite rule can be declared than that commodities
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product market definition tests whether a consumer, when faced with a
price change, is willing to stop buying that product and, instead, buy a
similar product from another company at a different price.
The Guidelines define the relevant geographic market as "a region
such that a hypothetical monopolist that was the only present or future
producer of the relevant product at locations in that region would profitably
impose at least a 'small but significant and nontransitory' increase in price,
holding constant the terms of sale for all products produced elsewhere." 105
Under this approach, the FCC begins its analysis by finding the areas in
which the merging firms compete with respect to the relevant product. The
FCC then extends the boundaries of that area until determining a
geographic area in which a hypothetical monopolist could raise prices by at
least a "small but significant and non-transitory amount." 106 Under these
conditions, in a geographic market without a monopoly, a consumer would
have more than one price at which to purchase a product. With these
considerations in mind, the FCC begins its public interest framework to
determine whether a merger should be approved.
III. THE ECHOSTAR-DIRECTV AND XM-SIRnus SATELLITE RADIO
MERGERS UNDER THE FCC PUBLIC INTEREST FRAMEWORK
A. The Denied Echostar-DirecTV Merger
The FCC denied the EchoStar-DirecTV merger (collectively, New
EchoStar Applicants) because the merger would have likely harmed
competition in the multichannel video program distribution (MVPD)
market, 107 thereby outweighing any merger-specific public interest
benefits. 108 Specifically, the FCC found that the loss of competition within
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes .... ").
105. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 103, at § 1.21.
106. HORIZONTAL MERGER COMMENTARY, supra note 59, at 5-6; see also United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 589 (1966) (stating that "[tihe central issue is where does a
potential buyer look for potential suppliers of the service-what is the geographical area in which
the buyer has, or, in the absence of monopoly, would have, a real choice as to price and
alternative facilities? This depends upon the facts of the market place, taking into account such
economic factors as the distance over which supplies and services may be feasibly furnished,
consistently with cost and functional efficiency.").
107. Richard Gilbert & James Ratliff, Sky Wars: The Attempted Merger of EchoStar and
DirecTV 4 (2000), elsa.berkeley.edu/users/gilbert/wp/Dish-DirecTV-merger.pdf ("MVPD
suppliers are entities that offer multiple channels of video programming for purchase by
subscribers or customers.").
f.8 Press Release, FCC, FCC Declines to Approve EchoStar-DirecTV Merger, (Oct. 10,
2002)d [hereinafter New EchoStar Press Release] (on file with FCC), available at
20091
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the MVPD market would harm consumers by eliminating an existing
competitor in every market, which would not only create potentially higher
prices and lower service quality, but would also reduce future
innovation. 109
1. Description of the Companies at the Time of the Merger
EchoStar, an early innovator in the satellite television business,
designed the first nationwide installation network dedicated solely to
satellite television systems. 10 Since 1996, EchoStar has been providing
continuous direct broadcast satellite (DBS) service to customers throughout
the United States. " Hughes, a wholly owned subsidiary of General
Motors (GM), 112 directly owned all of DirecTV Enterprises, Inc. and
remained EchoStar's only satellite television competition in the market. 113
Unlike the Sirius XM Applicants, the New EchoStar Applicants had no
financial problems at the time of the proposed merger. 114
2. The Proposed EchoStar-DirecTV Merger
The New EchoStar Applicants promised that many benefits would
result from the merger. 115 Along with being the single provider of DBS
service in the United States, 116 New EchoStar would hold all
authorizations for the DBS frequencies and provide broadcasting to areas
previously not served by either company. 117 The New EchoStar
Applicants claimed that the merger would allow DBS to be more
competitive with cable systems in the MVPD market because of the
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-227263A 1 .pdf.
109. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20663.
110. Application of EchoStar Communication Corporation, General Motors Corporation,
Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and EchoStar Communications Corporation,
Transferee, for Authority to Transfer Control, Consolidated Application for Authority to Transfer
Control, at 9 (2001) [hereinafter New EchoStar Consolidated Application].
11. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 12.
113. See id. at 12-13.
114. See id. at 13 (stating DirecTV had over 10.3 million subscribers as well); according to
an SEC filing, as of June 30, 2002, EchoStar had 7.46 million subscribers, see EchoStar
Commc'ns Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 18-22 (Jun. 30, 2002); Gen. Motors Corp.,
Quarterly Report, (Form 10-Q), at 20 (Jun. 30, 2002) (showing that both DirecTV and Echostar
experienced increases in revenue prior to filing their applications to merge).
115. New EchoStar Consolidated Application, supra note 110, at i-ii.
116. EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., Quarterly Report (Form I0-Q) at 18 (June 30, 2002).
117. See New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20571-72.
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elimination of overlapping programming services. 118 The merger would
also further expand programming choices and create new services for DBS
customers. 119 However, despite these claimed benefits, which could have
increased competition in the MVPD market, the FCC denied the merger. 120
3. The FCC Ruling
The proposed transaction raised significant concerns with the FCC
because, for the majority of consumers, the merger would reduce the
number of competitors in the cable industry, resulting in either a duopoly or
monopoly. 121 Relying on antitrust principles, the FCC concluded that "a
merger to duopoly or monopoly faces a strong presumption of illegality"
and that "where a proposed merger would result in a significant increase in
concentration in an already concentrated market, parties advocating the
merger will be required to demonstrate that claimed efficiencies are
particularly large, cognizable and non-speculative." 122
In coming to its relevant product market definition, the FCC worried
about the new company's ability to potentially eliminate non-satellite
television competition in the television broadcasting industry and thus raise
prices. 121 Cable and DBS providers differ in the specific characteristics of
their service packages and the number of channels they are able to offer. 124
Since DBS is able to offer more channel choices than typical cable systems,
DBS providers have an incentive to raise prices. 125 Because the DBS
service can offer these more attractive packages, consumers will be willing
to pay higher prices for DBS, resulting in a loss of cable television
subscribers. 126 Additionally, New EchoStar would have a greater incentive
and ability to raise prices after the merger in areas served by low-capacity
cable systems compared to areas served by high-capacity systems. 127 Any
price discipline from having a cable competitor would then disappear, and
the merged entity would eliminate competition in the MVPD market. 128
118. See New EchoStar Consolidated Application, supra note 110, at 27.
119. Id. at 20-21.
120. See generally New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note .75, at
20559.
121. Id. at 20604.
122. Id. at 20605.
123. Id. at 20605-06.
124. Id. at 20608.
125. Id.
126. See New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20608.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Based on the above factors, the FCC was unable to conclusively
define the product market. 129 However, it adopted EchoStar and
DirecTV's proposal for a MVPD product market, as this was the broadest
of any proposed market definition and tended to minimize any
anticompetitive harm in the analysis. 130
The two companies urged the FCC to adopt the relevant geographic
market as national in scope due to their national pricing plans for monthly
subscriptions. 131 However, the FCC determined that the relevant market
was local because consumers make their decisions based on the MVPD
choices at their residences. 132 The FCC stated that the geographic market
was each customer's residence, and ultimately concluded that, "the relevant
geographic market should be presumed to be the franchise area of a local
cable operator, since customers within that franchise area have the choice
between the incumbent franchised cable company and the two DBS
providers." 133
Based on the FCC's findings that MVPD was the relevant product
market for DBS and that the geographic market was local, the FCC
determined that the proposed deal was anti-competitive in nature due to the
unilateral steps the new entity could take to increase prices. 134 Therefore,
since the transaction could have increased concentration in an already
concentrated market, 135 the FCC denied the merger, citing the possibility
that the merging firms would find it profitable to unilaterally raise prices
and suppress output. 136 Furthermore, the FCC found that the merger in the
MVPD industry would result in collusion among MVPD providers 131
because "research [had] shown that firms in concentrated, oligopoly
markets take their rivals' actions into account in deciding the actions they
will take." 138 Hence, the MVPD providers and the new DBS service would
engage in interdependent, anti-competitive conduct of raising prices. 139
The FCC determined that the consumer harms resulting from the
abovementioned unilateral effects, which failed to take into account MVPD
129. Id. at 20609.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20610.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 20620.
135. Id. at 20616.
136. Id. at 20620.
137. Id. at 20625.
138. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20624.
139. Id.
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collusion, seriously underestimated the harms to consumers post-merger. 140
The FCC next determined from the record that a merger would reduce
innovation and service quality. 141 The FCC noted that both DirecTV and
EchoStar improved their services and types of programming offered, but
that these changes were motivated by competitive pressures between the
two companies. 142 Post-merger, the FCC feared that this decreased
competition could have created a disincentive to improve services or
quality. 143
The FCC also examined the potential public interest benefits that the
merger may have in the MVPD market. 144 The EchoStar Applicants urged
that the merger would enable them to improve spectrum efficiency by
eliminating duplicative programming. 145 This would allow them to offer
both new and improved services to consumers 146 and also result in
potential cost-savings benefits. 147 However, the FCC found that these
spectrum efficiencies would not necessarily result in merger-specific public
interest benefits 148 and that the cost savings were too speculative. 149 First,
the FCC noted how the efficiencies would result in private economic cost
savings benefits for New EchoStar, but that these savings would not
translate into lower costs for the public. 150 Additionally, the FCC noted the
possibility that New EchoStar would use the spectrum less efficiently than
either company would individually use it absent the merger."'
Accordingly, the FCC held that the claimed benefit arising from the
EchoStar Applicant's promise for increased programming was highly
speculative and appeared to lack credibility. 152
The EchoStar Applicants also claimed that they would be better able
to compete with cable systems as a single full-service DBS provider to the
benefit of customers. 153 The FCC agreed that the new entity would be a
more capable competitor for cable customers, but that this did not translate
140. Id. at 20625-26.
141. Id. at 20626.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20630.
145. Id. at 20631.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 20637-38.
148. Id. at 20633.
149. Id. at 20637.
150. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, 20632-33.
151. Id. at 20633.
152. Id. at 20634.
153. New EchoStar Consolidated Application, supra note 110, at i.
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into more effective competition in the MVPD marketplace to the benefit of
consumers. 154
For the above reasons, the FCC determined that the EchoStar
Applicants did not meet their burden of demonstrating that the merger was
in the public interest. 155 Importantly, the FCC noted its own "long history
of establishing spectrum-based commercial services with no fewer than two
participants per service, with the aim of creating competitive markets for
spectrum-based voice, video and data services." 156 Indeed, the FCC could
find "no example where [it] permitted a single commercial spectrum
licensee to hold the entire available spectrum allocated to a particular
service." 157 The FCC essentially believed that the purpose of the EchoStar
application was to "approve the replacement of viable facilities-based
competition with regulation." 158 The FCC viewed the two DBS providers
as healthy competitors and found that approval would be inconsistent with
the Communications Act and FCC regulatory policies, which aim to
replace regulatory safeguards with free market competition in situations
where a single provider serves an entire market. 159 The FCC correctly
concluded that permitting a single licensee to hold the entire spectrum to a
single service would be detrimental to competition and consumers. This
burden on competition and harm to consumers greatly outweighed any of
the above mentioned benefits of the transactions, thus failing the public
interest standard. 160
B. The (Wrongly) Approved XM-Sirius Merger
Five years after the FCC denied the EchoStar-DirecTV merger, the
FCC was once again given the opportunity to rule on a proposed merger
that would similarly permit a single commercial spectrum licensee to hold
the entire available spectrum of a particular service. 161 The FCC similarly
found that permitting such a transaction would create a monopoly. 162
However, it distinguished this case from EchoStar on the grounds that the
voluntary commitments taken by Sirius XM would mitigate all
154. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20639.
155. Id. at 20646.
156. Id. at 20662.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 20663.
160. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20646.
161. See New EchoStar Press Release, supra note 108; see Sirius XM Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12360.
162. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20604.
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monopolistic effects and therefore be in the public interest. 163 Going
against prior precedent, the FCC allowed Sirius and XM to merge into
Sirius XM Radio, granting this new entity the entire available spectrum to
satellite radio. 164
1. Description of the Companies at the Time of the Merger
Unlike EchoStar and DirecTV, both XM and Sirius were heavily in
debt at the time of the merger, and still are as a combined entity. 165
However, the companies believed that as a merged entity, they could
potentially lower their costs and prevent their systematic failures. 166
Prior to the merger, XM offered over 170 music channels to over 9.03
million subscribers and used half of the available SDARS spectrum. 167
XM transmitted its content throughout the Unites States to vehicles,
portable receivers, home receivers, plug-and-play receivers, and had
agreements to install SDARS receivers in different vehicle models for
various vehicle manufacturers. 168 Several of its channels were devoted to
Major League Baseball, the National Hockey League, the Indy Racing
League, traffic and weather channels, and an emergency station. 169
Gaining most of its revenue through its subscription services, XM
was unable to turn a profit. 170 At the time of the merger application, it was
$1.5 billion in debt. 171 Warning investors in its 2007 annual 10-K filing,
XM admitted, "[u]nless we continue to increase our revenues, we may not
be able to operate our business and service our indebtedness and you could
lose money on your investment." 172
XM pointed out numerous vulnerabilities to the viability of its
service. 173 In order to become profitable, XM had to attract and retain
more subscribers, maintain the costs of attracting and retaining subscribers
and programming, compete successfully, and operate at an acceptable
163. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12376.
164. See infra Part III.A.3.
165. See Sirius Annual Report, supra note 4, at 18; XM Annual Report, supra note 4, at 17.
166. See THOMAS W. HAZLETT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE SATELLITE RADIO MERGER 3,
(2007) http://www.orbitcast.com/archives/HazlettPaperwithTransmittal_-_Final.pdf.
167. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12353.
168. Id. at 12354.
169. Id. at 12353-54.
170. XM Annual Report, supra note 4, at 7.
171. Id. at F-6.
172. Id. at 18.
173. See id. at 17-25.
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level. 174 The company also exposed its economic vulnerability by
admitting that it may never become profitable because demand for its
service may not be strong enough. 175 For its business plan to work, XM
needed additional financing which may not have been offered at favorable
terms. 176 Furthermore, XM had expensive contracts with General Motors,
Major League Baseball, and on-air personalities, 177 faced potential loss and
degradation of its satellites, 178 suffered competition from other forms of
music players and providers, 179 incurred increased marketing costs, 180 and
received low advertising revenues. 181 Therefore, it was no surprise when
XM decided to enter into a merger agreement with Sirius.
Sirius offered over 130 channels to over 8.3 million subscribers
through its satellite radio service. 182  Along with various music
programming, Sirius offered weather and traffic coverage, emergency
information, National Basketball Association games, National Football
League games, NASCAR races, college sports events, as well as many
different talk radio programming including personalities such as Howard
Stem, Martha Stewart, and Barbara Walters. 183 Additionally, Sirius had
agreements with car manufacturers to include SDARS receivers in
vehicles. 184
As of December 31, 2007, Sirius was approximately $1.3 billion in
debt, which if Sirius defaulted, could have forced it to discontinue
operations or sell its assets. 185 Potential harms of the debt included:
limited abilities to borrow additional funds, limited flexibility in planning
or reacting to changes in the industry, increased vulnerability to adverse
economic and industry conditions, and being forced into dedicating a
substantial portion of its cash flow from operations to pay off the debt. 186
These factors would reduce the availability of money to fund capital
expenditures and other corporate purposes, and would place Sirius at a
174. Id. at 18.
175. Id.
176. XM Annual Report, supra note 4, at 19.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 20.
179. Id. at21.
180. Id. at 22.
181. Id. at23.
182. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12355-56.
183. Id. at 12356.
184. Id. at 12357.
185. Sirius Annual Report, supra note 4, at F-5.
186. Id. at 18.
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competitive disadvantage to XM Radio. 87 Sirius was concerned that it
may never turn a profit due to its debt and growing interest payments on
the existing debt and that the costs to renew its programming may be more
expensive than previous arrangements. 188 Sirius spent substantial money
on advertising and marketing to attract new customers and prevent an
ongoing loss of current customers to XM. 189 Because its primary source of
revenue was subscription fees, activation fees, and the sale of Sirius radios,
Sirius' loss of customers to XM could have been disastrous to the
company. 190
Although their programming may seem similar, XM and Sirius each
have significant engineering differences between their audio receivers. 191
In fact, there is no interoperable receiver capable of accessing all licensed
SDARS systems. 192 Although both companies use satellite and terrestrial
repeaters to deliver their programming to subscribers, each has taken a
different approach in utilizing the transmission of programming. 193 XM
operates its system using two active geostational satellites in orbit, 194
whereas Sirius uses three satellites in an inclined, elliptical non-
geostationary orbit. 195 The differences in the orbital location affect the
design of the antennas used to receive the satellites signals, the terrestrial
repeater network used to augment the satellite service, and the uplink
antennas used to communicate with satellites. 196 Additionally, the two
companies use their 12.5MHz of spectrum differently. 197 Sirius divides its
spectrum into three carriers of 4MHz each 198, whereas XM divides its
spectrum into six carriers. 199 As a result of these differences, XM and
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 18-19.
190. See id. at F-21.
191. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12360.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6.
195. SIRIUS SATELLITE RADIO INC., RESPONSE TO THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENT
REQUEST ISSUED ON NOVEMBER 2, 2007 BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 38 (2007)
[hereinafter SIRIUS INFORMATION REQUEST] (redacted for public inspection) available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf=pdf&id document=6519812427.
196. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, 12360.
197. See SIRIUS INFORMATION REQUEST, supra note 195, at 37; See also XM SATELLITE
RADIO HOLDINGS INC., RESPONSE TO THE INFORMATION AND DOCUMENT REQUEST ISSUED ON
NOVEMBER 2, 2007 BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 29 (2007) /hereinafter XM
INFORMATION REQUEST] (redacted for public inspection), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or pdf-pdf&id-document=6519817122.
198. SIRIUS INFORMATION REQUEST, supra note 195, at 38.
199. XM INFORMATION REQUEST, supra note 197, at 29.
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Sirius receivers cannot receive programming from the other service.200
2. The Proposed Sirius-XM Merger
On February 19, 2007, Sirius and XM entered into an Agreement and
Plan of Merger. 201 Sirius would absorb XM and become the surviving
corporation, holding all the FCC licenses and authorizations for SDARS.2 o2
The Application proposed that the merged entity would offer a variety of
programming packages at lower prices than currently available from either
company. 203 The companies stated that they would offer four A la carte
options, a "best of both" programming package, a "mostly news, sports and
talk" package, a "mostly music" package, and a "family friendly" package
at discounted prices, within three months after FCC approval of the
transaction. 204 Furthermore, both companies committed to set aside four
percent of their full-time audio channels for noncommercial educational
and informational programming, and another four percent to "qualified
entities." 20' They also proposed to not raise their rates for at least thirty-six
months after the completion of the merger, to allow any manufacturer to
develop equipment capable of delivering the radio service, and permit
manufacturers to incorporate other technology into any satellite radio
receiver (such as HD technology). 206 Until the development of new
technology, however, the merged entity is unlikely to convert to a common
platform because of the differences in satellite infrastructure, transmission
technology, and programming reception.20 7
3. The FCC Ruling
The FCC found that the proposed transaction, along with the
voluntary commitments made by XM and Sirius, would be in the public
interest by making available to consumers more programming choices at
various prices. 208  In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the FCC
200. See generally SIRIUS INFORMATION REQUEST, supra note 195, at 37; XM
INFORMATION REQUEST, supra note 197, at 29.
201. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 6.
202. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12358.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 12359.
205. Id.
206. Id. Furthermore, Sirius and XM agreed to provide service to Puerto Rico, and
committed that they would not bar others from including other audio technology in any device or
vehicle.
207. SIRIUS INFORMATION REQUEST, supra note 195, at 41, 43-46.
208. Sirius XM Press Release, supra note 12.
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stressed that absent the self-imposed constraints of XM and Sirius, the
merger would result in a monopoly. 209 Taking the worst-case scenario
approach, the FCC shielded the decision from further review and took the
first step towards creating new precedent, allowing FCC approved
monopolies and further consolidation. The FCC assumed a worst-case
scenario in its competitive analysis because the FCC found a lack of
evidence in the record to predict the likelihood of anticompetitive harms. 210
Incredibly, although the FCC found numerous potential harms under this
scenario, XM's and Sirius' voluntary commitments were enough to
mitigate the FCC's concerns, convince the FCC to approve the monopoly,
and even somehow categorize it as in the public interest. 211
The FCC was unable to define the product market and thus, under the
worst-case scenario approach, labeled SDARS as a separate relevant
product market. 212 It noted that because there had been little-to-no price
variation in XM and Sirius products ever since programming was offered to
the public, it was impossible to use econometric rules to define the relevant
markets and likely effects on price, as the FCC had been able to do in the
EchoStar-DirecTV order.213 The FCC also stated that the information in
various surveys that analyzed which products constituted the proper
product market was flawed.214 The FCC assumed that the relevant
geographic market was national, since both companies provide nationwide
215 thsservice. With these assumed markets, the FCC concluded that the
merged firm would be able to increase SDARS prices over a non-transitory
period of time. 216 However, the FCC held that the price-cap condition
eliminated any possible harms to consumers, and that the new
programming packages would allow consumers to choose from more
pricing choices. 217 Despite the FCC's determination that the new company
would have potential vertical effects in the SDARS and SDARS-related
equipment market, the Applicants' voluntary commitments to pennit any
manufacturer to develop SDARS receivers, and to incorporate other
technology in the receivers, ameliorated these concerns.218
209. Id.
210. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12372-73.
211. Id. at 12367.
212. Id. at 12373.
213. Id. at 12376.
214. See id. at 12369-72.
215. Id. at 12373.
216. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12375.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 12379.
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The Application listed many potential benefits to consumers: (1)
more programming choices at lower prices;219 (2) more diverse
programming; 220 (3) accelerated deployment of advanced technology; 221
(4) commercialization of interoperable radio receivers; 222 and (5)
operational efficiencies to safeguard the future of satellite radio. 223
The FCC agreed with XM and Sirius that the new packages they
planned to offer would provide consumers with additional choices that
would be priced lower than any of the Applicants' current, individual
offerings.224  Even though the Applicants' proposed "best of both"
package-which combines popular programs from both XM and Sirius-
was priced higher than either of their current offerings, it cost less than
subscribing to both services at once.225 The FCC found that the proposed A
la carte programming would result in a clear public interest benefit as
consumers would be able to tailor their programming to "match their
individual tastes and interests."226 Finally, the FCC noted that the A la
carte commitments functioned as additional safeguards against future price
increases.22a Absent a merger, the FCC found that these benefits would not
flow to the public because of the synergies and economies of scale created
by the merger; thus, the newly merged company would enjoy cost
advantages unable to occur absent the merger. 228 Now, with these cost
advantages from the merger, the FCC improperly assumes-or at least
hopes-the new entity will be able to pass these cost benefits to consumers
in the form of decreased pricing. 229
The FCC found speculative the evidence submitted by the Applicants
that the merger would benefit the public by accelerating the deployment of
advanced technology. 23 The additional capacity needed for the
deployment of such technology-such as real time traffic, rear seat video
devices, and advanced data and telematics for traffic and weather-would
not be available until after interoperable receivers were available. 231
219. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 10-12.
220. Id. at 12-14.
221. Id. at 14-15.
222. Id. at 15-16.
223. Id. at 17-20.
224. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12386.
225. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 10-11.
226. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12388.
227. Id. at 12389.
228. Id. at 12387-89.
229. Id. at 12388.
230. Id. at 12389-90.
231. Id.
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The Applicants further claimed they would introduce a commercial
interoperable satellite radio receiver. 232 However, the FCC's rules already
required the companies to make such a device. 233 In fact, when Sirius and
XM originally received their SDARS licenses in 1997, the FCC required
both companies to make an interoperable receiver that could access all
licensed SDARS systems.234  However, at the time of the merger
235application in 2007, neither Sirius nor XM made such a receiver.
Nevertheless, the FCC somehow accepted the companies' excuses that they
complied with the FCC order by merely designing an interoperable receiver
and that they did not have to actually manufacture and bring one to the
market. 236 Unfortunately, in its order allowing the merger, the FCC did not
require Sirius XM to assure consumer availability of a receiver, and did not
require that all receivers sold be interoperable. 237 The FCC also found that
the public interest would be served because Sirius XM would be required
to allow any third party to develop equipment to receive its satellite radio
238service.
Finally, the two companies claimed that the transaction would allow
the merged entity to achieve operational efficiencies that would reduce
costs, and that these cost savings would be passed on to subscribers in the
form of lower subscription rates. 239 The Applicants cited efficiencies, such
as reduced programming expenses through the elimination of duplicative
staffing positions, reduced operational expenses associated with the
broadcast and transmission of programming, reduced marketing and
subscriber acquisition costs, reduced duplicative research and development
efforts, and reduced general and administrative expenses. 240 However, the
FCC found that the claimed efficiencies would only benefit consumers by a
small percentage, and that not all of the benefits would flow to
consumers. 24  For instance, some of the operational expenses and
232. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 15-16.
233. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12390; see also 47
C.F.R. § 25.144(a)(3)(iii).
234. See generally SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5795-98.
235. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 15-16.
236. See Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12399.
237. Id. at 12401.
238. Id. at 12407. In doing so, Sirius XM must provide the intellectual property to third
parties who wish to develop receivers. Such third parties may include other technologies such as
HD radio, iPod ports, and Internet connectivity to further promote the public interest.
239. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 17-20.
240. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12391.
241. Id. at 12392-93.
2009]
460 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:435
economies of scale for equipment were not merger specific. 242
Additionally, the companies did not provide sufficient evidentiary support
to estimate a specific dollar amount that these claimed efficiencies would
save the company. 243 Indeed, some of these efficiencies could not be
expected to occur until several years after the closing of the transaction. 2"
Thus, the FCC found the efficiencies too speculative, just as it had done in
the EchoStar-DirecTV order. 245
When balancing the public interest harms against the benefits, the
FCC not surprisingly found that the "harms outweigh the potential
benefits." 246 However, it astonishingly found that "the presence of [the
Applicants'] voluntary commitments mitigates the harms and ensures that
benefits are realized." 247  The FCC noted that over time, the merged
company would have an increased incentive and ability to raise prices
above pre-merger levels; however, it inappropriately found that the
voluntary price cap was sufficient to prevent such a likely harm. 248 Not
knowing how the market would respond in the years to come, the FCC at
least minimally reserved the right to modify, remove, or extend the price
cap. 249
The FCC also found that the commitment to provide leased channel-
capacity to other programmers addressed the concern that a single provider
of SDARS would harm program diversity. 250 Specifically, the new
company pledged four percent of its audio channels to be reserved for a
"qualified entity" that will not be required to make any lease payments for
the channels. 251 Additionally, the merged entity will not be involved in the
selection of the qualified entity nor will it have editorial control over the
channels. 252 Furthermore, another four percent of the channels will be
reserved for noncommercial educational (NCE) use free of charge. 253 The
FCC unconvincingly found that such NCE use would serve the public
242. Id. at 12391.
243. Id. at 12391-92.
244. Id. at 12392.
245. Id. at 12393.
246. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12393.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 12394-95.
249. Id. at 12395.
250. Id. at 12410.
251. The companies defined a "Qualified Entity" as "any entity that is majority-owned by
persons who are African American, not of Hispanic origin; Asian or Pacific Islanders; American
Indians or Alaskan Native; or Hispanics." Id. at 12409, n.437.
252. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12410.
253. Id. at 12414.
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interest by maintaining a platform for diverse voices post-merger,254
despite this minimal allocation of channels.
Apparently, the FCC no longer feared that a single provider of a
communicative service could raise the same concerns that it expressed
when it denied the EchoStar-DirecTV merger. In the short run consumers
may benefit from lower prices, greater programming availability, and
increased channel diversity. However, in the long run these benefits are
not indefinite.
IV. NEW PRECEDENT FROM FORGOTTEN POLICY
In the order approving the Sirius XM merger, the FCC could not have
taken a more contradictory approach from its EchoStar-DirecTV denial,
despite both merger applications similarly representing the only companies
providing satellite service in their respective industries. 255 The FCC found
that in both instances, many of the public benefits were speculative and
each company would be able to increase the price of its services, as both
transactions would result in a monopoly. 256 The FCC ignored its prior
precedent of denying such a merger and disregarded the rules it set forth
when it licensed spectrum for SDARS because it felt that a three-year price
commitment made by Sirius XM would mitigate the monopolistic harms of
the merger. 257 These voluntary commitments were enough to tip the scale
from an unallowable monopoly into a transaction meeting the statutory
public interest test, as the conditions would allegedly prevent the
monopolistic effects.258 However, historically, Sirius and XM have
ignored FCC orders, making their commitment to follow the three-year
price cap and other conditions suspicious. 259
A. The FCC Disregarded Its Prior Precedent and Rules
If the FCC allows voluntary commitments to convert an unacceptable
merger into an FCC-approved entity, then it renders its analysis of relevant
geographic and product markets meaningless. EchoStar and DirecTV each
provided nationwide broadcast signals to subscribers who purchased a
254. Id. at 12411.
255. Id. at 12375-76.
256. See New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20629; Sirius
XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12395.
257. Sirius XM Press Release, supra note 12.
258. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12352.
259. See infra Part IV.B.
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special receiver and paid a monthly fee.260  Sirius and XM provided
nationwide broadcast signals to subscribers who also purchased a receiver
and paid a monthly fee. 261 Nevertheless, in the EchoStar-DirecTV denial,
the FCC rejected the Applicants' call for a national geographic market and
instead ruled that the relevant geographic market was the local, individual
household. 262 In its Sirius XM Order, however, the FCC said the relevant
market was national, as the broadcast signals reached across the whole
nation. 263 In the EchoStar-DirecTV denial, the FCC also stated that the
relevant product market was broader than just the DBS market and
included cable and other television providers. 264 But in the Sirius XM
Order, the FCC said the relevant product market consisted of only the
satellite radio market comprised of XM and Sirius, rejecting other radio
providers and audio devices.265 The FCC found that the EchoStar-
DirecTV transaction would eliminate competitors in every market, leading
to higher prices and lower service quality. 266 On similar facts, the FCC
found that the Sirius XM merger would also create a monopoly resulting in
an imposition of higher costs placed on consumers.267 Nevertheless, the
FCC failed to provide persuasive justification for this disparate
treatment. 268 By allowing XM and Sirius to impose self-restraints on
prices to mitigate these harms, the market definitions analysis has taken a
back seat to the new company's voluntary commitments, thus opening the
door for future end-runs around merger analysis. Additionally, the
conditions undermine the public interest standard set forth in sections 214
and 310 of the Communications Act, as it takes the potential harms of the
merger and mischaracterizes them under the guise of public benefits,
supporting mergers which do not deserve approval.
The FCC's major concerns, which led it to deny the EchoStar-
DirecTV merger, included maintaining no fewer than two participants per
service and the fear of allowing a single spectrum licensee to hold the
entire available spectrum allocated to a service. 269 Furthermore, the FCC
found the public interest would be better served through competition
260. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20609.
261. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at i, 3, 5.
262. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20609-10.
263. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12373.
264. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20609.
265. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12373.
266. New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, 20620, 20626.
267. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12394.
268. See id. at 12376.
269. See New EchoStar Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 75, at 20626, 20662
(discussing the importance of competition in the market).
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between two competitors, rather than having a single competitor subject to
regulations. 270
The FCC Order that approved the Sirius XM transactions violated the
FCC's own policies and its past precedent set in the EchoStar-DirecTV
denial. 271 Allowing the only two competing companies in an industry to
merge, with that merger conditioned upon voluntary commitments,
indirectly creates an FCC regulated monopoly that holds all available
licenses to the applicable spectrum. 272  The FCC denied the 2002
EchoStar-DirecTV transaction largely due to its preference for competition,
holding that allocating the spectrum to two companies that provide a given
service ensures sufficient competition to promote the public interest. 273
Although it is easy to understand why companies would prefer to "escape
the rigors of competition, 274 it is unreasonable to assume consumers will
be better off without it. 275 The recent FCC decision seems to be a
government approved bailout of a financially struggling industry. 276  In
fact, based on evidence presented in the Sirius XM merger application,
both companies might have failed without the merger, so arguably the
merger averts certain harms. 277 However, because the companies did not
seek approval based on financial viability, the FCC should assume that the
marketplace can support two financially viable satellite radio
competitors.278 By merging the only two existing satellite radio
companies, competition in the market-the primary driver of innovation
and progress-will no longer apply to satellite radio. Due to inadequate
merger conditions, the decision better serves XM's and Sirius' interests
279rather than the public interest.
Furthermore, the FCC completely disregarded its established SDARS
rules and policies promulgated in 1997, which expressed the FCC opinion
270. See id. at 20663.
271. See id. at 20626, 20662.
272. "The majority's argument is that it can stack up enough 'conditions' on the merged
entity-spectrum set-asides, price controls, manufacturing mandates, etc.-to tip the scale in
favor of approval. In essence, the majority asserts that satellite radio consumers will be better
served by a regulated monopoly than by marketplace competition." Sirius XM Memorandum
Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12443 (dissenting statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r).
273. New EchoStar Press Release, supra note 108.
274. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12444 (dissenting
statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r).
275. Id.
276. Steven Pearlstein, Out of Touch with Consimers, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2008, at D1.
277. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12444 (dissenting
statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 12450 (dissenting statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r).
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that competition is beneficial for consumers .280 Even though both
companies were forbidden from acquiring the license of the other company,
Sirius and XM argued in their merger application that this rule was not
binding, but rather a mere policy statement. 281 The FCC correctly rejected
this argument and instead held that it was a binding rule of substantive
law. 282 Yet, for the same reasons it concluded that the conditioned merger
was in the public interest, the FCC inconceivably concluded that repealing
the rule would serve the public interest as well. 283 Clearly, no longer does
"the public interest ... include the protection of competition, [and] not
,, 284competitors. The FCC expressed its concern that only competition
could foster technological advances and better services and rates to
consumers. 285 Now, this concern has been eliminated with regulation in
the form of voluntary conditions. 286
Moreover, approval of the merger violates the antitrust precedents
mentioned in Section 11(c) above. As demonstrated in FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., the court found a Clayton Act violation when a monopoly emerged in
markets where the possibility of a new entrant in the marketplace is
difficult and improbable.287 Here, not only has the FCC determined that
the merger (absent the conditions) constitutes a monopoly, but that the
possibility of a future entrant into the satellite radio market is highly
improbable as well. 288 This will surely lead to a permanent monopoly
which in no way fosters any competitive behavior. Additionally, the court
denied the merger in FTC v. Staples because Staples' largest and only rival
in certain markets would be eliminated. 289 Here, XM and Sirius are each
other's only competition and post-merger surely will have no other satellite
radio competitors.
Finally, the court in United States v. Franklin Electric held "it would
be odd if a merger of the kind at issue, from two producers to one, could be
justified by either the efficiencies it would generate or because the
280. See SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5796 (stating rule promotes competition by
reducing transaction costs and enhancing consumer choice).
281. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 50.
282. Sirius XM Press Release, supra note 12.
283. Id.
284. SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5759.
285. Id. at 5786.
286. Sirius XM Press Release, supra note 12.
287. FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 717 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting FTC v. H.J. Heinz
Co., 116 F.Supp. 2d 190, 196 (D.D.C. 2000)).
288. See Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12373.
289. FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1082 (D.D.C. 1997).
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company to be acquired is failing." 290 There, the claimed efficiencies were
speculative and not supported by any evidence nor guaranteed to benefit
consumers. 291 Here, the FCC determined that XM and Sirius' proposed
efficiencies were likewise speculative and would not result in a consumer
benefit either. 292 Just as the court in Franklin Electric rejected the merger
because it would have immediately changed a competitive market to a
monopolized market,293 the FCC here should have had the insight to reject
this merger for the same reason. Although these cases are but a small
amount of antitrust precedent, in no way has the FCC's approval of Sirius
XM promoted the ultimate antitrust law goals of promoting competition,
increasing trade, and preventing unfair methods of competition.
Ironically, in 2005, Sirius's General Counsel, Patrick Donnelly, stated
"[t]he competition between the two companies is fantastic[-]there
couldn't be anything more American about it." 294 This competition did not
last much longer after the statement was made, and the competition for
satellite radio services is now non-existent. Some proponents of the
merger, including Sirius and XM, argue that intermodal competition
between different audio platforms will be sufficient to discipline any
possible anticompetitive abuse from the newly formed company. 295
However, such intermodal competition failed to protect consumers from
price increases in the past. 296
B. Intermodal Competition Does Not Discipline Prices
Previous issues in the MVPD industry illustrate how intermodal
competition failed to discipline rate increases. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (Telecom Act) largely deregulated the cable industry in order
to expand DBS services and to remove barriers for phone companies and
other entrants wishing to enter the market. 297 The Telecom Act affected
the doubling of monthly cable bills while decreasing competition through
industry consolidation and market swapping.298 Furthermore, competition
290. United States v. Franklin Elec. Co., 130 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (W.D. Wis. 2000).
291. Id.
292. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12392-93.
293. Franklin Elec., 130 F. Supp. 2d at 1035.
294. Robert Vosper, A Lucky Star, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 2005.
295. See, e.g., Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at ii-iii.
296. See infra Part I.B.
297. See CELIA VIGGO WEXLER, COMMON CAUSE EDUC. FUND, THE FALLOUT FROM THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 11 (2005).
298. See Gary Wax, Comment, Cable Company Monopoly: Comcast and Time Warner
Control the Board, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 159 (2008).
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in the cable industry has been weak due to companies not expanding into
the market as predicted by the makers of the Telecom Act. 299
The Telecom Act resulted in deregulation that created a monopolized
cable industry where monopolists are able to push out competitors and raise
300subscription rates. 0 The Telecom Act failed to promote cable
competition and resulted in an ineffective system of price discipline. 301
The effects of a single satellite radio service provider will be similar. It is
misleading to believe that broadcast radio, digital Internet radio, and
mobile devices, such as an iPod, will discipline prices any more than
broadcast television, DVD players, digital video recorders, or DBS services
have disciplined cable prices. 302 For instance, in 2005, XM increased its
basic subscription cost from $9.99 a year to $12.95 a year.303 Free
terrestrial radio and iPods have been around since satellite radio launched,
yet this did not prevent increases in satellite radio prices. 3
Competition in the audio market has grown to include AM/FM
stations, news and talk radios, HD radio, mp3 players, and Internet
radio. 305 Satellite radio accounts for five percent of this marketplace. 306
However, iPods, Internet radio, terrestrial radio, and HD radio are too
dissimilar to satellite radio to influence satellite radio rates. For instance,
terrestrial radio targets a local audience because it depends on local
advertising for revenue. Consequently, this causes the radio station to
adjust its content to the audience that the advertisers want to reach and that
299. See In re Applications for Consent to the Assignment and/or Transfer of Control of
Licenses: Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors, to Time Warner Cable Inc., Assignees;
Adelphia Commc'ns Corp., Assignors & Transferors, to Comeast Corp., Assignees &
Transferees; Comcast Corp., Transferor, to Time Warner Inc., Transferee; & Time Warner Inc.,
Transferor, to Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 21 F.C.C.R. 8203,
8239 (rel. July 21, 2006).
300. See Wax, supra note 298, at 159.
301. See id.
302. See Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 23-45 (arguing that satellite
radio is a small part of a highly competitive and expanding market for audio entertainment, which
will help regulate prices), but see Petition to Deny of Common Cause, Consumer Federation of
America, Consumers Union and Free Press at 40-42, In re XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.,
Transferor, and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee: Consolidated Application for Authority to
Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57 (2007)
[hereinafter Petition to Deny] (arguing that satellite radio is in a distinct product market in which
other forms of audio competition will not discipline prices).
303. Ian Bell, XM Satellite Radio Increases Rate to $12.95, DIGITAL TRENDS, March 3,
2005, http://news.digitaltrends.com/news-article/6728/xm-satellite-radio-increases-rate-to- 12-95.
304. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 41.
305. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12456 (statement of
Robert M. McDowell, Comm'r).
306. Id.
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the radio station can reach. 307 Furthermore, terrestrial radio is subject to
content regulation. "' Satellite radio, however, serves a national audience
and offers more specialized and diverse programming regardless of where
it is received. 309 High Definition radio is subject to the same local market
and regulates content similar to terrestrial radio. 310 Furthermore, it is not
commercial free, does not have a large range of channels in a variety of
formats, and does not have exclusive programming available, such as
sports games and radio talk shows. 311 Storage devices, such as iPods,
require that the consumer find and download the content and additionally
lack the characteristics of satellite radio, such as being able to expose
listeners to new content and giving the listener the sophistication of the DJ
mixes. 3 2 The iPod remains geared more towards downloaded music rather
than live programming, such as sports and talk shows. 313 Internet radio is
also dissimilar to satellite radio in many ways: it is mainly a redistribution
platform for terrestrial radio, it is inferior to satellite radio in quality, it is
not available in automobiles, and it requires consumers to have access to
broadband. 314
Even if these products were found to be substitutes to satellite radio,
the FCC still states that the relevant product market does not include
anything except satellite radio. 315 Thus, it is presumptuous to assume that
satellite radio competes for subscribers with these other services and that
these above platforms will bring upon price discipline. 316
C. Flaws in the Voluntary Conditions
This merger grants Sirius XM increased market power that allows the
post-merger monopoly to raise prices in the future when the price-freeze
expires. If the two companies never merged, it is unrealistic to believe that
prices would not have declined, as the companies would have remained in
competition with each other. 317 In fact, increased competition between the
two companies could have led to the A la carte programming that Sirius XM
307. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 28.
308. Id.
309. See What is Sirius, supra note 2; What is XM, supra note 2.
310. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 30.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 32-33.
313. Id. at 33.
314. Id. at 35.
315. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12373.
316. Id.
317. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 42.
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now offers, and this competition could have driven subscription prices
down to make subscribing to both Sirius and XM economically feasible for
consumers. 318 Additionally, the three-year price-freeze fails to compensate
consumers for the cost increases they may have to pay when the freeze
ends and competition in satellite radio will be entirely absent. 319 Further,
despite the voluntary price commitment,
after the first anniversary of... the merger, the combined
company may pass through cost increases incurred since the
filing of the merger application as a result of statutorily or
contractually required payments to the music, recording and
publishing industries for the performance of musical works and
sound recordings or for device recording fees. 320
In other words, while the merger agreement may subject Sirius XM to price
commitments now, the FCC specifically allows the combined entity to pass
on certain cost increases to consumers after a year. 321 The three-year price
control would, therefore, prove to be illusory to the extent that consumers
inevitably will bear these costs. 322
In addition to increased fees, consumers may experience lower quality
programming. 323 Experts disagree whether available technology would
allow the companies to add more channels without diminishing audio
quality. 324 For instance, both companies are currently straining their
transmission capabilities. 325 This increased compression of transmission
channels reduces the quality of audio output for the consumer. 
326
Therefore, even if Sirius XM could compress the data without
compromising quality, this technological limitation would still require
Sirius XM to upgrade the existing infrastructure-a cost likely borne by the
consumers. However, such technology might not be available for many
years. 327
318. Id. at44.
319. Id. at42.
320. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12394.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 12443 (dissenting statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r).
323. Charles Babington, Radio Deal Could Face Technical Difficulties, WASH. POST, Mar.
19, 2007, at D1.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. See The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 69 (2007) (statement on behalf of Common Cause,
Consumers Union, The Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, Media Access Project, and
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Over time, gradual price increases will have a dramatic adverse
impact on consumers. 328 In his dissenting statement of the merger, FCC
Commissioner Michael J. Copps warned, "[t]he inescapable logic of the
majority's findings is that by 2011 satellite radio subscribers will face
monopoly price hikes by a company with the incentive and ability to
impose them. No one has been able to explain to me how this could
possibly serve the public interest." 329 Indeed, the FCC overlooked certain
fees on the price-cap condition. Specifically, "equipment subsidies,
ancillary services, activation fees, termination fees, and transfer fees"
continue to undermine consumer protection, as consumers also bear these
costs. 330
Furthermore, the FCC acknowledged its skepticism that there will be
a competitive entrant into the satellite radio industry in the foreseeable
future, as it is unlikely that any unencumbered spectrum will be
available. 331 Additionally, it will also take any potential entrant years to
develop the necessary infrastructure and technology in order to become a
viable competitor. 332 Therefore, Sirius XM will possess unprecedented
market power for at least that many years post-merger, and without
consumer protections in place, Sirius XM may fail to act in the public
interest when the price caps are eliminated.
The FCC's merger approval will also lead to unfavorable terms for
the people and industries that relied upon the competition between Sirius
and XM for satellite radio related contracts. For instance, pre-merger, the
companies competed with each other to sign long-term contracts with
automakers, music and radio personalities, marquee programmers, and
retail distributors. 3 Sirius Chief Executive Officer, Mel Karmazin, stated
to investors that post-merger, the "advertising line is going to contribute
significantly in the future towards [average revenue per user]." 334  Mr.
Karmazin's statement suggests that advertisers will face higher costs for
Prometheus Radio Project).
328. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 42.
329. Sirius XM Memorandum Report and Order, supra note 3, at 12443 (dissenting
statement of Michael J. Copps, Comm'r).
330. Id. at 12446-47 (dissenting statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r).
331. Id. at 12418.
332. Id. at 12373.
333. Consumeraffairs.com, Consumer Groups Urge FCC to Reject XM-Sirius Merger, May
13, 2008, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/05/xmsiriusconsumers.html.
334. Sirius XM Memorandum Report and Order, supra note 3, at 12447 (dissenting
statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r) (quoting Investor Presentation, Sirius Satellite
Radio Inc. and XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.) (Feb. 20, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908937/000095012307002469/y3O6O4be425.htm).
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advertisements and that consumers may have to listen to increased
commercial content. 335 Clearly, satellite radio consumers are not the only
ones who will feel the negative impacts of the merger. The existence of a
sole satellite radio company now eliminates any leverage that a person or
group previously held in negotiating better contractual terms. Sirius XM
not only has increased market power as the single provider of satellite
radio, but now also as the single buyer of satellite radio content. 336
Finally, the provision that set aside four percent of Sirius XM's
channels for noncommercial education and information programming and
another four percent to a Qualified Entity do not substantially add to what
both services offered pre-merger. 33 This eight percent of channels set
aside is the equivalent of twenty-four total channels. 338 As expressed by
Senators John Kerry (D-MD), Claire McCaskill (D-MO), and Benjamin
Cardin (D-MD), this allocation does not guarantee more diverse and
informational programming, as XM and Sirius currently offer twelve such
channels. 339 The senators unsuccessfully urged the FCC to preserve
anywhere between twenty to fifty percent of Sirius XM's satellite capacity
to such programming, as it would further strengthen the potential for
enhanced minority programming. 340 The order states, "we will determine
the implementation details for use of these channels [for qualified entities]
at a later date,, 341 leaving it unclear how the FCC will choose these
qualified entities. The FCC consistently claims that diversity programming
is an important factor in the public interest framework. 342 However, the
FCC's unpredictable test for choosing these entrants does not ensure an
increase in diversity programming, but rather demonstrates the FCC's
willingness to bypass a cornerstone of its precedent in order to allow the
merger. 34  Further, a minimal number of channels set aside for
335. Id.
336. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 46 (noting that now that there is only one satellite
radio company, Sirius XM will be able to increase prices for advertisements as well as contract
on-air talent for cheaper than when there were two companies).
337. See Sirius XM Memorandum Report and Order, supra note 3, at 12449 (dissenting
statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r).
338. Id. at 12442 (statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman).
339. Letter from John Kerry, Claire McCaskill, and Benjamin Cardin, U.S. Sens., to Kevin
Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission (June 27, 2008) [hereinafter Letter to
Kevin Martin], available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or..pdf=pdf&id-document=-6520032219.
340. Id.
341. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12411.
342. Id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 532(a) (2000).
343. See Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12449 (dissenting
statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Conmn'r).
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noncommercial and qualified entities will have a negligible effect in
offsetting the concentration of media that this transaction permits. 34
D. Sirius and XM Refused to Follow Previous FCC Orders
Sirius and XM argue that the merger is in the consumer interest
because, for the first time ever, consumers will be able to get packages that
include programming previously exclusive to each company. 345 However,
because the two companies did not previously comply with FCC orders, the
merged entity only offered this option to consumers after the merger.
According to the conditions that the FCC imposed when the SDARS
providers received their initial licenses, both XM and Sirius had to develop
an interoperable receiver that allowed those consumers who subscribed to
both companies' services to access both satellite radio services through a
single piece of hardware.346 However, the companies insufficiently
interpreted their commitment to create an interoperable radio, and instead
simply designed an interoperable receiver, failing to actually manufacture
and introduce one to the market. 3 Perhaps the companies feared that if
they introduced an interoperable receiver to the market, then their
subscribers could easily jump from one service to another. 348 As one
commentator put it, Sirius and XM gave the FCC the option to give them a
monopoly, or else consumers would not be able to listen to football games
transmitted by one service and baseball games transmitted by the other
service.349 Because the companies did not comply with the interoperability
requirement pre-merger, the companies created switching-costs for
consumers that effectively limited pre-merger competition between the
companies. Additional hardware costs involved with receiving the new
service likely discouraged satellite radio consumers from switching
services. 350 Even three senators questioned Sirius XM's ability to deliver
an interoperable radio post-merger. 3' Yet, this previous failure to adhere
to an FCC order is only one indication that Sirius XM will fail to comply
with new FCC-imposed conditions.
The FCC repeatedly acknowledged XM's and Sirius's non-
344. See id.
345. Sirius XM Consolidated Application, supra note 6, at 10-11.
346. SDARS Rules, supra note 36, at 5797.
347. Petition to Deny, supra note 302, at 45.
348. See Pearlstein, supra note 276.
349. Id.
350. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12449 (dissenting
statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r).
351. Letter to Kevin Martin, supra note 338.
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compliance with FCC rules. 352 For instance, the FCC started an inquiry
into whether the FM modulator wireless transmitter on certain XM radios
complied with emission limits and whether XM operated terrestrial
repeaters without FCC approval. 3 The extent of the latter violation was
so great that the new company must either shut down or bring one hundred
repeaters into compliance with FCC guidelines. 3 These past violations,
in addition to the companies' failure to comply with the FCC's
interoperability order, make it unconvincing for the FCC and consumers to
trust Sirius XM's commitment to comply with the conditions of the merger.
"[A]n applicant's willingness to deceive the Commission on a material
matter raises fundamental questions about whether the applicant can be
relied upon on a going-forward basis." 355 A history of multiple violations
should have undermined the FCC's confidence to count on Sirius XM to
deliver to consumers on its new promises. 356
V. CONCLUSION
On February 17, 2009, Sirius XM bonds valued at $175 million
became due.357  Unable to finance this debt on its own, Sirius XM
contemplated filing bankruptcy to restructure its debt until Liberty Media
Corporation stepped in with a $530 million rescue package in the form of
two separate loans. 358 Liberty Media also owns a large stake in DBS
provider DirecTV; therefore, the parties may integrate the satellite radio
and satellite TV technologies to better serve consumers. 359 However, the
loan encompasses a fifteen percent interest rate 360 with maturity dates set
352. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12425-26.
353. Id. at 12423-24; XM Annual Report, supra note 4, at 19.
354. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12452 (statement of
Deborah Taylor Tate, Comm'r).
355. Letter from David K. Rehr, President and CEO, National Association of Broadcasters,
to Matthew Berry, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission (July 15, 2008)
available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or..pdf pdf&id-document=6520034210.
356. See id.
357. Martin Zimmerman, Bids for Sirius "M May be Fueled by Longtime Rivalry, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at Cl.
358. Jill Goldsmith, Liberty Fends OffSirius Bankruptcy, DAILY VARIETY, Feb. 17, 2009,
at 1; Sirius XM Radio Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 1 [hereinafter Sirius XM Current
Report] (Feb. 17, 2009).
359. Zimmerman, supra note 357.
360. See Steven M. Davidoff, Parsing Sirius XM's Form 8-K (Sirius's Last Chance),
DEALBOOK, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/18/parsing-sirius-xms-form-8-k-siriuss-
last-chance/; Sirius XM Current Report, supra note 358, at 1.
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for 2011 and 2012 3 6 1-an indication of the high risk posed by a company
that has never turned a profit. 362
This financing also presents another interesting issue, as both Liberty
Media and EchoStar competed to rescue Sirius XM. 363 Liberty Media's
loan first consisted of $280 million to Sirius and then of $150 million to
XM. 364 The merged entity received two different loans, and two different
companies offered to supply the capital needed for Sirius XM to remain
financially viable. 365 However, Sirius XM waited until the last minute to
get this finding-the day both of the individual company's debts were due.
There is no reason why each company could not have engaged in talks with
EchoStar or Liberty Media prior to initiating a merger. Indeed, both
companies disclosed in their 10-K forms the high risk of their debt that
would soon be due.366 Now, they are proverbially "having their cake and
eating it too," since Liberty Media, for the time being, has solved the
merged entity's financial problems, and the FCC gave it unprecedented
control of the satellite radio industry.
The FCC's public interest analysis of the Sirius XM merger was
nothing but a utopian satellite radio dream. With over seventeen million
subscribers since its inception in 2002, satellite radio is clearly a popular
format.367 Perhaps with the addition of A la carte programming, the ability
to receive programming from both Sirius and XM, and the possible
synergies with DirecTV, the merged entity will further expand and finally
become financially viable. These new developments would enable the
merged entity to use its allotted spectrum to bring new services, features,
and benefits to consumers. Realistically, the only true benefit that may
flow to consumers from this transaction is that the FCC maintained the
right to extend or modify the merger conditions.368
For the first time in its history, the FCC allowed a single provider of a
service to hold all available licenses for that particular service.36 9
Consumers will no longer benefit from the head-to-head competition
between Sirius and XM, but rather must rely on Sirius XM to comply with
361. See Davidoff, supra note 360; Sirius XM Current Report, supra note 358, at 1-4.
362. See Davidoff, supra note 360.
363. Goldsmith, supra note 358.
364. Id.
365. Id.
366. Sirius Annual Report, supra note 4, at 18; XM Annual Report, supra note 4, at 39.
367. See Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12351; XM Annual
Report, supra note 4, at 19.
368. Sirius XM Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 3, at 12445 (dissenting
statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r).
369. Id. at 12442.
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the FCC-imposed merger conditions. Although Sirius XM will offer
consumers more programming at cheaper prices for at least the first year
after the merger, the future for consumers remains uncertain as both
companies have a history of noncompliance with FCC rules, and Sirius XM
will be able to pass certain costs on to subscribers after only one year.
Furthermore, this merger will open the door for future consolidation
in the media industry, resulting in increased market power for newly
merged companies. Since the FCC abolished its SDARS license
acquisition rule, any future entrant (if able to receive any unencumbered
spectrum or gain the capital for start up costs) may be bought out by Sirius
XM, essentially creating a perpetual monopoly of satellite radio. Satellite
radio started with noble beginnings, as the FCC believed this new
programming format could drastically increase the public benefit through
new technology and innovation. A decade later, the public interest no
longer appears to be the FCC's concern, as this merger merely replaced the
public interest test with a private interest test at consumers' expense.
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